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ADVERSE POSSESSION-MISTAIKEN BOUNDARY LINE. Bartlett v.
Boyd.-Two difficult questions arise in boundary line disputes where
one person claims to have acquired title to his neighbor's land under
the statute of limitations. First, what sort of claim must accompany
the possession in order to set the statute into operation? Second,
what must be proved by the claimant in order to make out a prima facie
case against the owner?
Mere possession by one person of another's land is insufficient to
set the statute of limitations into operation. It was early estab-
lished that acts done on another's land will be taken to have been
done in subordination to the will of that other unless the contrary
is shown.2 It is frequently said that an actual disseisin is necessary
to make possession adverse and the requirements of a possession
which will satisfy the statute have been moulded on the early common
law requirements for a disseisin. But the analogy is not to be pushed
too far, for in many places it breaks down, as for instance where
there is no wrongful entry which was necessary to a disseisin.3 Die-
1. (1915) 175 S. W. 947.
2. Blunden v. Bagh (1632) Croke Car. 302.
3. Doe d. Parker v. Gregory (1834) 2 A. & E. 14; Tiffany, Real Prop-
erty, § 436.
(39)
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seisin involved a hostile claim and to this extent possession must
amount to a disseisin in order to be adverse.4 This does not mean,
however, that the hostile claim must be asserted by the possessor
with a knowledge of the rights of the true owner and an intent to
subvert them. A claim is hostile If it cannot be Justified alongside
the rights of the owner.
In several early cases the Missouri Supreme Court seems to have
taken the position that there could be no disseisin by unconscious
mistake.r In Knowlton v. Smith,e It was held that the statute did
not run in favor of one who had "no intention of asserting an adverse
title." Such a rule would place a premium on dishonesty and reward
conscious wrongdoing for persons who were conscious of no wrong-
doing would derive no benefit from long continued possession. The
consequence of such a rule has been recognized In Missouri In at
least boundary line cases, and In Walbrunn v. Ballen 7 and many
subsequent decisions 8 It has been held that a hostile claim may be
made by one who believes himself to be the owner of the land which
he Is claiming.
The adverse possessor must make an unequivocal claim to the
land possessed. If for instance a boundary fence is located merely
for the purposes of convenience, it Is clear that no claim at all is
made.0 If it is located upon what is supposed to be the true line
and if title is claimed to all of the land up to the boundary fence,
then the possession is clearly adverse; 10 but if the fence is located
by one who believes it to be on the true line but whose assertion of title
to the land possessed up to what is believed to be the true line is
made only with intent to change the location of the line whenever
the error Is ascertained, then clearly the possession is not adverse."1
Color of title does not seem to be necessary for the claimant never
relies upon constructive possession where a boundary line has actually
been established.12
4. Pt. Louis University v. McCune (1859) 28 Mo. 481; Ktncaid v. Dor-
mey (1871) 47 Mo. 337; McCabe v. Bruere (1899) 123 Mo. 255, 54 S. W. 450.
5. Cf. Cutter V. Waddingham (1855) 22 Mo. 200.
6. (1865) 36 Mo. 507.
7. (1878) 68 Mo. 164.
8. Cole v. Parker (1879) 70 Mo. 372 ; Goltermnan v. Schiermeyer (1892) 111
Mo. 404, 10 8. W. 484; Hamilton v. West (1876) 63 Mo. 93; Flynn v. Waeker
(1899) 151 Mo. 545, 52 S. W. 545; Datis V. Braswell (1904) 185 Mo. 576,
84 S. W. 870: Battner v. Baker (1891) 108 Mlo. 311, 18 8. W. 911.
9. Hilgedick v. Gruebbel (1912) 246 Mo. 140, 151 S. W. 731.
10. ''anto, v. Kellogg (1871) 121 Mo. 482. 26 8. W. 341: Hal dlan v.
MeManus (1889) 100 Mo. 124, 13 S. W. 207: Hedges v. Pollard (1899) 149
Mo. 216, 50 S. W. 889; Milligan V. Fritts (1909) 226 Mo. 189, 125 S. W. 1101.
11. Keen v. Schnedler (1886) 92 Mo. 516, 2 8. W. 312: Pinch v. Ullman
(1890) 105 Mo. 255, 16 S. W. 863; McWilliams v. Samuel (1894) 123 Mo. 659,
27 S. W. 550: Roecker v. Haperla (1897) 138 Mo. 33. 39 S. W. 454.
12. Mather ;. Walsh (1891) 107 Mo. 121. 17 S. W. 755: Golterman v.
chtermeyer (1892) 111 Mo. 404, 19 S. W. 484; Hedqes v. Pollard (1899)
149 Mo. 216, 50 S. W. 889; Oloyd v. Franek (1912) 248 Mo. 468, 154 8. W.
744.
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The difficulty arises In determining what is the nature of the claim
which is made. Mere possession does not of itself establish a claim of
title for without more it should be taken to be in subordination to
the rights of the true owner. If the parties have agreed upon a
location for the boundary line there is no room for saying that the
possession of one is in subordination to the title of the other, hence
no further proof of claim of title is necessary.13 It would seem that
cultivation of the land beyond the true line is not In itself sufficient
to establish a claim of title,14 tho it is probably evidence of a claim.
So with the payment of taxes. The evidence of the erection of a sub-
stantlal and permanent building on the land is probably sufficient
proof of a claim of title.15 Declarations by the possessor are most
frequently relied on, but it would seem that they are only evidence
of the character of the possession which might in some instances be
held to have been in subordination to the will of the owner in spite
of the declaration by the possessor that he claimed title.
One who claims land by adverse possession has the burden of
proving that the possession was adverse, I.e., that he or his pred-
ecessor was in actual, notorious and continuous possession under claim
of title for the statutory period.16 But in Hedges v. Pollard,17 an
exception was engrafted on this rule to the effect that the claimant's
burden is to show only that he has possessed under an apparent claim
of title; and that he need not show his possession was not subject to
subsequent ascertainment of the true line, the burden being on the
owner to go ahead with such proof after the claimant's burden is
discharged. This exception would seem to Involve relieving the claim-
ant of the necessity of full proof that his possession was under an
unequivocal claim of title. When the claimant has discharged the
burden of showing that the circumstances of the possession established
an apparent claim of title, the owner has the duty of showing that the
claimant's possession was subject to the ascertainment of the true line.
This exception seems to have been accepted by the court in Lemmons
v. McKinney,'s but it does not seem to have been involved because of
an agreement as to the boundary line in that case. In Gloyd v.
Franck,'9 the defendant had erected a building on part of the plaintiff's
lot, which being of a substantial and permanent nature was sufficient
13. Turner v. Baker (1876) 64 Mo. 218; Schad v. Sharp (1888) 95 Mo.
574, 8 S. W. 549; Krider v. Milner (1889) 99 Mo. 145, 12 S. W. 461; Brum-
mell v. Harris (1901) 162 Mo. 397, 63 S. W. 497.
14. Crawford V. Aherns (1890) 103 Mo. 88, 15 S. W. 341; Ford v. Me-
Annelly (1908) 215 Mo. 371, 114 S. W. 990.
15. lIamilton v. West (1876) 63 Mo. 93; Mather v. Walsh (1891) 107 Mo.
121, 17 S. W. 755: Handlan v. McManus (1889) 100 Mo. 124, 13 S. W. 207;
Gloyd v. Franck (1912) 248 Mo. 468, 154 S. W. 744.
16. Bradley v. West (1875) 60 Mo. 33; Lumber Co. V. Craig (1912) 248 Mo.
319, 154 S. W. 73 and cases cited.
17. (1899) 149 Mo. 216, 50 S. W. 889.
18. (1901) 162 Mo. 525, 63 S. W. 82.
19. (1912) 248 Mo. 468, 154 S. W. 744.
10 LAW SERIES, MISSOURI BULLETIN
to establish a claim to title. The court said that the burden of showing
that the defendant intended to claim only to the true line wherever
that should be ascertained to be, rested on the plaintiff. The reversal
of the judgment in that case was placed on an instruction which was
erroneous with reference to another part of the lot which was not thus
possessed.
As an exception to the general rule that the claimant has the
burden of showing that his possession was adverse, there would seem
to be no good reason for this doctrine. Perhaps what the court actually
means in these cases is not that the burden of proof is on the owner
to show that the claimant held subject to an ascertainment of the true
line, but that the evidence in each of the cases in which the excep-
tion is stated was sufficient to establish the claim of right which would
make the possession adverse unless the true owner could offer further
evidence which would impugn the unconditional nature of the claim of
right. The claimant has the burden of showing by preponderance of
evidence that he claims title to the strip possessed at all events. It
would seem under the Missouri doctrine that he ought to be held not
to have discharged this burden until he has shown that his claim was
in no wise subject to a future ascertainment of the true line. But
the courts have not consistently held that a possession is not adverse
until it is shown not to have been subject to the ascertainment of the
true line, and have held that possession may be shown to be adverse,
at least sufficiently for a recovery by the claimant, as a result of ordi-
nary proof of a claim of right. It would seem to follow that any sug-
gestions in the evidence of the owner that the claim was subject to a
future ascertainment of the true line should be sufficient to enlarge
the claimant's duty to include a showing that his possession was not
subject to a future ascertainment of the true line. Logically, there-
fore, if any burden is to be put on the owner, it should be a burden
of going forward and not a burden of proof.
In the recent case of Bartlett v. Boyd,20 the Supreme Court relied
on Hedges v. Pollard and Leminons v. McKinney and re-stated the ex-
ception that when the possession of either of two adjoining landowners
has been held under an apparent claim of exclusive ownership for
the statutory period, the burden is upon the other to show that such
holding was subject to a future ascertainment of the correct line. But
the evidence in Bartlett v. Boyd tended very strongly to show that
the claimant's possession was adverse, for he had refused to abide
by any survey which did not recognize his fence as the true line. It
seems clear that he was claiming to own to the fence, so it -was un-
necessary to hold that the burden of proof that the claim was con-
ditional was upon the owner of the land. The court seems inclined
20. (1915) 175, S. W. 947.
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to continue the exception, however, without any recognition of its
logical effect in forcing the owner to assist an adverse claimant in
proving the adverse character of his possession.
LAURANCE M. HYDE.
EVIDENCE-REPUTATION OF DECEASED. State v. Ross.1 Evidence as
to the reputation of the deceased in cases of homicide Is usually
irrelevant and therefore inadmissible. To this rule there are two
exceptions. First, where the issue is self-defense and the character
of the killing is doubtful, evidence of the reputation of the deceased
as a violent and dangerous man is competent for the purpose of
determining whether the deceased was the aggressor. 2 In these cases,
it Is immaterial whether the reputation of the deceased was known
to the defendant, "for the question is what the deceased probably did,
not what the defendant probably thought the deceased was going to do."
For the same reason, uncommunicated threats are admissible when
there is doubt as to whether the deceased was the aggressor.3 The
second exception also arises In cases where the plea is self-defense,
and evidence of the reputation of the deceased as a violent and danger-
ous man may be introduced as bearing upon the reasonableness of
defendant's apprehension of danger at the time of the killing, provided
that the defendant is shown to have been familiar with the reputation
at the time.4
Thus only In cases where self-defense is pleaded is evidence of the
reputation of the deceased admissible. Accordingly, where the slaying
is done with a felonious intent such evidence is not relevant and is
therefore inadmissible.5 But even in the cases where the deceased's
reputation Is admissible under a plea of self-defense it seems that the
defendant must first put it in issue.6 After the defense has attacked
the character of the deceased, then the state may rebut by showing
his good reputation.7 It is often difficult to tell when the defendant
has put the deceased's reputation in issue. It seems clear that the
1. (Mo.. 1915) 178 S. W. 475.2. 1 Wigmore, Evidence. § 63; State v. Hensley (1886) 94 N. C. 1021.
1032; De Arnian v. State (1882) 71 Ala. 351, 361. See State V. Rider (1886)
90 Mo. 54, 61 ; 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 361. But cf. State v. Feeley (1905) 194 Mo.
300; State v. Barrett (1912) 240 Mo. 161.
3. State v. Smith (1901) 164 Mo. 567.
4. 1 Wigmore, Evidence, § 246; State v. Downs (1886) 91 Mo. 19 and
cases cited Horbacek v. State (1875) 43 Tex. 242: Commonwealth v. Tircinski
(1905) 189 Mass. 257, 75 N. 1. 261; Marts v. State (1875) 26 Ohio St. 162;
Franklin v. State (1856) 29 Ala. 17.
5. State v. ,acksoa0 (1853) 17 Mo. 544; State v. Byrd (1897) 121 N
C. 684, 28 S. E. 353 and cases cited; Commonwealth v. Straesser (1893) 153
Pa. 451, 26 Atl. 17: Abbott v. People (1881) 86 N. Y. 460.
6. State v. Potter (1874) 13 Kan. 310, cited with approval in State v.
Reed (1913) 250 Mo. 379, but In the latter case the deceased was admitted
as a witness thru his dying declaration. Moore v. State (1904) 46 Tex. Crim.
App. 54. 79 S. W. 565; Jimmerson v. State (1902) 133 Ala. 18, 32 So. 141.
7. State v. Feeley (1906) 194 Mo. 300: State v. Woodward (1905) 191
Mo. 617: PettiR v. State (Tex. Crlm. App., 1904) 81 S. W. 312; Mitchell v.
State (1902) 133 Ala. 65, 32 So. 132.
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state need not wait until the defendant has introduced a witness who
specifically testifies that the deceased's reputation was bad.8 It has
been held sufficient if the defendant attacks deceased's reputation by
showing that he was a quarrelsome and dangerous man,9 or that he was
the aggressor 10 or that he had made threats against the defend-
ant."l Proof that the deceased was a quarrelsome and dangerous man
when drinking was held to warrant the admission of evidence in
rebuttal that deceased was a peaceable and law-abiding citizen.12 But
an allegation that deceased tried to rob the defendant at the time of
the slaying is not such an attack upon his reputation as to justify
the admission of testimony by the state to show deceased's good reputa-
tion.13
In State v. Ross,14 recently decided by the Missouri Supreme Court,
a woman charged with the murder of her husband pleaded insanity.
In the lower court the state was allowed, over the objection and
exception of the defendant who had not attacked the deceased's reputa-
tion, to introduce evidence of the husband's good reputation "as a
peaceable, law-abiding, upright, honest, hard-working man". The de-
fense later Introduced testimony as to the deceased's bad treatment of
the defendant. It Is clear from the preceding cases that the state's
evidence was clearly inadmissible at the time it was introduced, was
"especially so in this case, by reason of the fact that there was no
claim by the defendant that the killing was in self-defense, but Insanity
was relied upon as the sole defense." The Supreme Court held the
admission of this evidence reversible error because "such evidence tends
to detract the minds of the jury from the principal question."
While there are no cases exactly in point, the principal case seems
in line with the following analogous cases. It is reversible error to
show the defendant's reputation for violence and turbulence when he
has not put his character in issue. 15 It is also fatal error when the
testimony is conflicting to show the trustworthiness of a witness
before his reputation for truth and veracity has been attacked.16 Again
it Is reversible error when the deceased has become a witness through
his dying declaration to introduce testimony as to his reputation for
peace and quietude when it has not been attacked by the defend-
ant.17 In the principal case, the court probably treated the defend-
8. State v. Vaughan (Nev., 1895) 39 Pac. 733, 735.
9. Pettis v. State (1904) 47 Tex. Crim. App. 66, 81 S. W. 312; State v.
Vaughan (1895) 22 Nev. 285, 39 Pac. 733; People v. Gallagher (1902) 78 N.
Y. Supp. 5.
10. Thrawley v. State (1899) 153 Ind. 375, 55 N. E. 95.11. Russel V. State (1881) 11 Tex. App. 288; Sims v. State (1898) 38
Tex. Crim. Rep. 637.
12. State v. Feeley (1906) 194 Mo. 300.
13. State v. Reed (1913) 250 Mo. 379.
14. (Mo., 1915) 178 S. W. 475.
15. State v. Beckner (1905) 194 Mo. 281.
16. State v. Thomas (1883) 78 Mo. 827.
17. State v. Reed (1913) 250 Mo. 379.
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ant's evidence as insufficient to put the deceased's character In issue,
In which case the state's evidence was wholly irrelevant and there-
fore its admission was reason for reversal. Nor was the error cured
by the defendant's evidence if it was introduced only for the purpose
of rebutting what the state had already erroneously introduced. In
State v. Beckner,18 it was held that the error of the state in proving
defendant's reputation for violence and turbulence was not cured by
the defendant's later introduction of testimony to disprove the same.
But " the defendant's testimony was introduced for the purpose of
putting deceased's reputation in issue and really was sufficient to
put it in issue, then there would seem to be no reason for a reversal,
because it would then be only a change in the order of proof and
probably would not affect the Issues. J. P. HANNIGAN.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-RECOVERY AGAINST SPOUSE FOR TORT COMMITTED
DURING COVERTURE. Rogers v. Rogers.-This was an action for damages
for false imprisonment In causing the plaintiff to be committed to, and
for several months confined in, an insane asylum. At the time of the
commission of the tort, and when the suit was brought the plaintiff
was the wife of the defendant. The court denied recovery on the
ground that the married women's act does not give such a right of
action.
At common law the identity of the wife became merged In that
of her husband upon her marriage. In general they were regarded
as one person, and that person was the husband 2. As a consequence
neither could contract with nor sue the other.3 The wife's contracts
and conveyances were void. In equity, however, the duality of the
husband and wife was recognized and whenever the Interests of the
two were conflicting the wife was allowed to maintain an action
against her husband 4; but only actions relating to property could be
maintained. The husband could restrain the liberty of his wife or
chastise her at will so far as the non-criminal law was concerned,5 tho
she could Institute criminal prosecution against him.6
The Identity theory of husband and wife has been restricted by
the various married women's acts. These acts 7 usually allow suits
to be brought by and against a married woman with the same force
18. (1905) 194 Mo. 281.
1. (1915) 177 S. W. 382.
2. Frissell v. Rozier (1854) 19 Mo. 448; Lindsay v. Archibold (1895)
65 Mo. App. 117.
3. Counto v. Markling (1875) 30 Ark. 17; Jennie v. Marble 37 Mich.
319; Lindsey V. Archibold (1896) 65 Mo. App. 117.
4. Smith v. Smith (1882) 18 Fla. 789; Randall v. Randall (1879) 37 Mich.573.
5. 1 Blackstone, Commentaries, p. 444.
6. Fulgham v. State (1871) 46 Ala. 143; Lawson v. State (1902) 115 Ga.
578, 41 S. I. 993.
7. Revised Statutes 1909, §§ 1735, 8304.
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and effect as if she were a feme sole, and provide that a married woman
shall be deemed a feme sole so far as to enable her to transact her own
business, contract and be contracted with, sue and be sued. Under
such statutes the disability to contract with her husband as well as
with third persons is removed, and she may maintain an action against
her husband in her own name on all contracts entered into with him.8
Not only is this true of contracts, but the rule is also the same when-
ever the husband unlawfully interferes with his wife's property.o Thus
she may bring replevin,1o detinue,1 trover,1 2 and ejectment V9 to protect
her property rights. It is interesting to note in this connection that
when a statute gives a wife a remedy against her husband at law, the
remedy in equity is not superseded.14
If under the enabling acts a cause of action arises in the wife's
favor from wrongful infliction of injury upon her by another, why does
not the wrongful infliction of such an injury by her husband give her
a cause of action against him? The right to bring such an action is
usually denied on the ground of public policy, that it would tend to
invade the sanctity of the home and shatter the sacred relations of
marriage. The denial of the right is sometimes based on the construc-
tion of the married women's acts. These acts vary in different jurisdic-
tions. Some have been held to change the legal status of husband
and wife, abolishing their legal identity.15 Under such an interpreta-
tion it is clear that the wife should be able to maintain an action
against her husband for personal torts inflicted during coverture and
in several recent cases such an action was allowed.- The married
women's acts are usually interpreted as leaving the marriage status
unchanged and as merely providing exceptions to the necessary con-
sequences of the status. This was, in effect, the view taken by the
Supreme Court in Rogers v. Rogers 17 where the statute was con-
sidered as one of procedure, and being in derogation of the common
law could not be held to grant any greater power than its terms
express. The husband never having had a similar right against the
8. Montgomery v. Montgomery (1910) 142 Mo. App. 481, 127 S. W. 118:
Abbott v. Fidelity Tru8t Co. (1910) 149 Mo. App. 511. 130 S. W. 1120.
9. Bruce v. Bruce (1892) 95 Ala. 563, 11 So. 197; Cook v. Cook (1900)
125 Ala. 583, 27 So. 918; Gillespie v. Gillespie (1896) 64 Minn. 381, 67 N.
W. 206.
10. Howland v. Howlanid (1880) 20 Hun 472; White v. White (1885)
58 Mich. 546; Jones v. Jones (1865) 19 In. 236.
11. Bruce v. Bruce (1892) 95 Ala. 563, 11 So. 197.
12. Ryerson v. lRyerson (1890) 8 N. Y. Supp. 738: Whitney v. Whitney(1867) 49 Barb. 319; Mason v. Mason (1892) 21 N. Y. Supp. 306, conversion
by wife of husband's property.
13. Wood v. Wood (1881) 83 N. Y. 575; Cook v. Cook (1900) 125 Ala.
583, 27 So. 918.
14. Woodword v. Woodward (1899) 148 Mo. 241, 49 S. W. 1001.
15. Brown v. Brown (1914) 88 Conn. 42, 89 Atl. 889; Fledeer v. Fiedecr
(Okla.. 1914) 140 Pac. 1022.
16. Schultz v. Schultz (1882) 63 How. Pruc. 81 ; Brown v. Brown (1914
88 Conn. 42, 89 Atl. 889: Fiedeer v. Fledeer (Okla., 1914) 140 Pac. 1022.
17. (1915) 177 S. W. 382.
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wife, the statute was construed to confer on her no greater rights than
those possessed by the husband. The result reached is in accord with
the prevailing view in other states. Thus no recovery was allowed a
wife in assault and battery,1s slander,19 malicious prosecution 2o and
false imprisonment.21 Nor is the result different when the action is
brought after divorce.22
The idea that public policy is so opposed to allowing a wife to
maintain an action against her husband for personal torts harps back
to the worn and hackneyed theory of invading the sanctity of the
home and to the favorite bugaboo of increased litigation. It is dif-
ficult to perceive how any home in which personal injuries are inflicted
can have any tone of sanctity. The denial of a recovery will not
prevent the injuries. On the contrary it may conduce to the infliction
of them. It is true that the rule prevents an exposure of domestic
dissensions, but will they not be as fully exposed in a divorce action
or a criminal proceeding? That to allow the wife an action for damages
against her husband for personal injuries would increase litigation is
a weak and unavailing argument. Such an increase can produce no
harm if the litigation is necessary for the redress of real injuries.
The Supreme Court in Rogers v. Rogers 23 did not base its decision on
public policy, but upon the ground that the statute 24, whether con-
strued as a declaration of substantive rights or as a rule of procedure
should not be construed to grant any greater power than its terms
express. Another section 25 expressly declares what actions a married
woman may maintain. It refers to contracts and property rights but
not to torts. The court in construing this section held that it con-
ferred no greater rights upon the wife than those possessed by the
husband, and since he never had the right to recover from his wife
for personal torts, she cannot maintain such an action against him.
It is clear that the married women's acts In Missouri are not broad
enough to confer upon the wife the right contended for in Rogers v.
Rogers. These acts are the result of the changed economic and social
18. Peters v. Peters (1875) 42 Ia. 182; IAbby v. Berry (1883) 74 Me. 286;Strom v. Strom (1906) 98 Minn. 427, 107 N. W 1047 Logendyke v. Logendyke(1863) 44 Barb. 367; Abbe v. Abbe (1897) 48 N. Y. §upp. 25; Syes v. Ree(1908) 102 Tex. 451, 112 S. W. 422; Thompson v. Thompson (1910) 218 U.
S. 611.
19. Freethy v. Freethy (1865) 42 Barb. 641 : Mink v. Mink (1895) 16 Pa.
Co. Ct. 189; Young v. Youngq (Scotland, 1903) 5 Faculty Decisions 330.
20. Tinkley v. 'Tinkley 24 Times L. H. 691.
21. Abbott v. Abbott (1877) 67 Maine 304: Main v. Main (1891) 46 II1.
App. 106. Contra: Brown v. Brown (1914) 88 Conn. 42, 89 Atl. 889; Fiedeer
v. liedeer (0kla., 1914) 140 Pac. 1022.
22. Phillippg V. Barnett (1876) 1 Q. B. D. 436; Peters v. Peters (1875)
42 Ia. 182 : Abbott v. Abbott (1877) 67 Me. 304; Libby v. Berry (1883) 74 Me.
286: Bandfleld v. Bandfield (1898) 117 Mich. 80, 75 N. V. 287; Strom v. Strom(1906) 98 Minn. 427, 107 N. W. 1047. Freethy v. Freethy (1865) 42 Barb.
641: Logendyke v. Logendyke (1863) 44 Barb. 366 ; NMhokerson v. Nickerson
(1886) 65 Tex. 281.
23. (1915) 177 S. W. 382.
24. Revised Statutes 1909, § 1733,
25. Revised Statutes 1909, § 8304.
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conditions under which a married woman is no longer to be restricted
in the use of her property. The common law rule denying the wife
a tort action against her husband is as much unsuited to present
conditions as the disabilities which prevailed before the adoption of
the married women's acts, and it would seem that a change is desira-
ble. But the statute has not made it, and the rule of the common
law is too plain for it to be made except by the legislature. The
question then arises whether, if the change be made, any present rules
of evidence would so restrict the right as to render it of little or no
value.
From early times a husband and wife have been incompetent to
testify for or against each other. The rule rests on the common law
theory of identity and on the ground of public policy that to allow
one to testify in favor of or against the other would conduce to family
discord and dissension destroying the sanctity of the home. What-
ever may be the reason for the rule, it prevails in Missouri notwith-
standing the statute removing the disqualification of interest.2 o Thus
In civil actions a wife or husband is incompetent to testify either In
behalf of or against the other in cases in which either is a party to
the record, or not being a party, has some beneficial interest in the
result.2 7 This rule was not followed in two instances where public
policy was altered by the necessities of justice. In a civil action
against a dramshop keeper for selling plaintiff's husband liquor, the
husband was allowed to testify.28 A wife was held competent to testify
in behalf of her husband in an action by him against a doctor for
producing an abortion on her.29 By statute 3 a wife cannot testify
concerning admissions or conversation made by her husband either to
her or to third persons. Nor are declarations made by a wife to third
persons admissible against her husband.31 In divorce proceedings, of
course, the incompetency does not exist. In any case in which both
husband and wife are interested either may testify tho it inures to
the benefit of the other.32
The rule is different in criminal cases. By statute 33 the dis-
qualification by reason of being husband or wife is removed to the
extent that either may testify in favor of the other at the option
of the one accused. Without the defendant's consent, however, the
26. Revised Statutes 1909, § 6354.
27. Smoot v. Judd (1901) 161 Mo. 673, 61 S. W. 854 , Orchard v. Collier
(1902) 171 Mo. 390, 71 S. W. 677; Layson v. Cooper (1903) 174 Mo. 211, 73
S. W. 472; Berst V. Moxom (1911) 157 Mo. App. 342, 138 S. W. 74; Conn.
Fire Ins. Co. v. Chester etc. Ry. Co. (1913) 171 Mo. App. 70, 153 S. W. 544.
28. Pettis County V. DeBold (1909) 136 Mo. App. 265, 117 S. W. 88.
29. Cramer v. Hurt (1900) 154 Mo. 112, 55 S. W. 258.
30. Revised Statutes 1909, § 6359; State v. Loutz (1905) 186 Mo. 122,
84 S. W. 906.31. State V. Richardson (1905) 194 Mo. 326, 92 S. W. 649.
32. Toovey v. Baxter (1894) 59 Mo. App. 470; Layson v. Cooper (1902)
174 Mo. 223: 73 S. W. 472; Pace v. St. Louis 8. IV. Ry. Co. (1913) 124 Mo.
App. 227, 156 S. W. 746.
33. Revised Statutes 1909, § 5242.
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other is incompetent.3 4 This is true as to offenses committed before
the marriage takes place 35 and as a result the prosecuting witness
has occasionally been rendered incompetent to testify by reason of
her marriage to the accused. There is an exception to the rule of
incompetency of husband or wife as witnesses in criminal cases. As has
been pointed out above, one spouse cannot maintain an action against
the other for personal injuries, but the injured one could gain relief
in a criminal prosecution. Thus for all personal injuries criminal in
their nature inflicted by one spouse upon the other a criminal prosecu-
tion may be maintained in which either is competent to testify against
the other.36 This exception represents an attempt to escape the rigor
of the rule denying the wife a recovery for such injuries in a tort
action, and is allowed by reason of the necessity that otherwise the
wife would be without protection. It is extended no further than that
necessity requires, hence it is confined to cases of personal violence
endangering bodily safety or liberty.37 Desertion, however, is con-
sidered such a crime against the wife as to admit her testimony
against the husband.38
Divorce does not entirely remove the disqualification. In Toovey
v. Baxter,389 the court held that a divorced wife was a competent witness
in a civil action in which her former husband was a party, except as
to communications between them while the marital relations existed.
On the other hand, a divorced wife Is not a competent witness against
her former husband in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed
on third persons during the marriage. This is true not only of con-
versation had between them, but of any facts witnessed by her.40 It
appears from the decisions that the wife of a deceased husband is a
competent witness in an action against her husband's estate concerning
all knowledge derived wholly by the exercise of her sense of sight, but
not as to conversations or admissions made by her husband either to
her or to third persons.41
This summary of the existing law leaves it clear that no change
of the rules of evidence is necessary in order to clothe the wife with
an effective right of recovery against her husband for a personal tort.
It is submitted that public policy necessitates such action by the legisla-
34. State v. Willis (1893) 119 Mo. 485, 24 S. W. 1008; State v. Burlingame(1898) 146 Mo. 207, 48 S. W. 72; State v. lyooley (1908) 215 Mo. 620, 115 S.
W. 417.
35. State v. Evans (1896) 138 Mo. 117, 39 S. W. 462.
36. State Y. Arnolrl (1874) 55 Mo. 89: State v. Willis (1893) 119 Mo.
485, 24 S. W. 1008: State v. Peaninton (1894) 124 Mo. 388, 27 S. W. 1106.
Cf. State v. Witherspoon (1910) 231 Mo. 706, 133 S. W. ,23. But Fee State
V. Berlin (1868) 42 Mo. 372.
37. State v. Pennington (1894) 124 Mo. 388, 27 S. W. 1106.
38. State v. Newrberry (1869) 43 Mo. 429; State v. Bean (1904) 104 Mo.
App. 255, 78 . W. 640.
39. (1894) 59 Mo. App. 470.
40. State v. Kodat (1900) 158 Mo. 125, 59 S. W. 73.
41. Shanklin v. McCracken (1897) 140 Mo. 348, 41 S. W. 898; Brown v.
Patterson (1909) 224 Mo. 639, 124 S. W. 1.
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ture and that a simple addition to the statute 42 can accomplish this
result effectually. G. L. DOUTHITT.
LOST CIHATTELS-FINDEt'S RIGHT TO POSSESSION. Foster v. Fidelity
Safe Deposit Co.1-The distinction between lost and misplaced chattels
seems to have attained a fixed place in our law, the it has little in
principle to support it. Goods are not lost if they have been put in a
place intentionally tho the place has been forgotten by all who had
anything to do with putting them in it. To be lost, goods must be
so situated as to justify the assumption that they have been uninten-
tionally and involuntarily permitted to be where they are.2 Direct
proof as to whether a chattel Is lost is in most cases impossible and
the determination must usually rest upon the inference to be drawn
from the location and position of the chattel at the time it is found.
A pocket book 3 or a whip 4 discovered upon a counter in a shop,
or a pocket book placed on a table in a shop by a customer.I or a
pocket book discovered on a customer's desk in a banking room G
has been treated as misplaced property, not lost. In State v. McCann 7
it was held that a pocketbook discovered on a counter in a store was
not lost but misplaced property and as such, even tho the owner was
unknown, it could be feloniously taken. It is assumed in such cases
that the articles were voluntarily and intentionally placed and it
has been uniformly held that the owner of the realty on which the
article is misplaced has a better right to it than the one who discovers
it,s because of his prior possession.
At common law the finder of lost property has no right as against
the owner and he is liable only for gross negligence in the care of it.9
But as to the rights of a finder against a third person, it is often
broadly stated that the former is entitled to the lost chattels as against
all persons except the true owner.10 When the finder gives the found
chattel to a third disinterested party for safe keeping until the owner
is traced, the finder may recover possession of it from the third party."
Lost property found in a public or quasi-public place goes to the finder
42. Revised Statutes 1909, § 8304.
1. (Mo., 1915) 174 S. W. 376.
2. Lawrence v. State (1839) 1 Hunmphrey (Tenn.) 228; Louckw v. Gal-
logly (3892) 23 N. Y. Supp. 126. See Kuykendall V. Fisher (1906) 61 W. Va.
87, -6 S. E. 48.
3. McAvoy v. Medina (1866) 11 Allen (Mass.) 548.
4. People v. MeGarren (1857) 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 460.
5. Lawrence v. State (1839) 1 Humphrey (Tenn.) 228.
6. Kincaid v. Eaton (1867) 98 Mass. 1'9.
7. (1835) 19 Mo. 249.
8. Loucks v. Galloglt (1892) 23 N. Y. Supp. 126: MeAvoy v. Medina(1866) 11 Allen (Mass.) 548; Kincatd v. Eaton (1867) 98 Mass. 139.
9. Dougherty v. Posegate (1856) 3 Iowa 88.
10. Pinkhar v. Gear (1826) 3 N. H. 484; Williams v. State (1905) 165
Ind. 472, 75 N. E. 875.
11. Tancil v. Seaton (1877) 28 Grattan (Va.) 601: Wrilliams v. State(1905) 165 Ind. 472, 75 N. E. 875; Amory v. Delamirie (1822) 1 Str. 505.
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instead of the owner of the place in which it is found. To illustrate,
money found on the floor of a barber shop 12 or a pocketbook found by
a servant of a hotel in one of the parlors, 13 goes to the finder rather
than to the person on whose premises it is found. The finder's
right is based on his possession of the chattel and on the fact that
no one else at the moment of finding had possession of it.
When, however, the lost property is found on private premises
there is a conflict of authority as to whether the owner of the locus
in quo or the finder is entitled to it. In Burdick v. Cheseborough,14
it was held that altho the finder is rightfully on the private premises,
the owner of the premises is entitled to the found goods. It appeared
that the article was found embedded in the realty. The owner of the
land was given the property on the ground that it had become a part of
the realty. Like facts appeared in South Staffordshire Water Co. v.
Sharman 15 and in Ferguson v. Ray 16 and in Eliwes v. Briggs Gas Co.,1 '
but the decision in favor of the owners of the locus in quo was rested
on the ground that their possession of the realty gave them possession
of everything on it and not because the found chattels had become a
part of the realty. McDowell v. Ulster Bank,'5 in which the porter
of defendant found some bank notes on the floor while sweeping out
after closing hours, did not allow the finder to recover, but this was
because finding articles on the floor in such a way was an incident
to his employment. The decision in South Staffordshire Co. v. Sharman
could be rested on this ground but such an explanation was not sug-
gested in the opinion.
There are several cases denying that the owner of private premises
is entitled to the chattel found thereon as against the finder. In
Bowen v. Sullivan,'9 an employee in defendant's paper mill found an
envelope of bills in a bundle of papers bought by the defendant and
was held to be entitled to them as against the defendant. Danielson v.
Roberts,20 Weeks v. Hackett 21 and Robertson v. Ellis 22 hold that a
person who is rightfully on private premises and who finds treasure
trove thereon, is entitled to it as against the owner of the locus tn quo.
These cases, however, are to be distinguished on the ground that they
deal with treasure trove, and the common law rule is that in the event
the owner is not found, treasure trove goes to the crown. Weeks v.
Hackett holds that the distinction between treasure trove and lost
goods has been abolished. Only one of the cases, however, cited as
12. Bridges v. Hawkesworth (1852) 7 Eng. L. & Eq. 425.
13. Haenaker v. Blanchard (1879) 90 'a. St. 377.
14. (1904) 94 N. Y. App. Dlv. 532, 88 N. Y. Supp. 13.
15. (1896) 2 Queen's Bench 44.
16. (1904) 44 Oregon 557, 77 Pac. 600.
17. (1886) 33 Ch. Div. 562.
18. (1899) 33 Irish Law Times 225.
19. (1878) 62 Ind. 281.
20. (1904) 44 Oregon 108, 74 Pac. 913.
21. (1908) 104 Me. 264, 71 Atl. 858.
22. (1911) 58 Oregon 219, 1.14 ['ac. 100.
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sustaining this contention is in point. This case is Danielson v. Roberts,
where it is expressly said that this question has never been decided
in this country and that it is not necessary to decide it in this case.
Roberson v. Ellis is the only case which squarely holds that this
distinction has been abolished. Dicta in these last three cases indicate
that the same rule would apply even tho the goods found were lost
property instead of treasure trove. Certainly the cases holding that the
finder under such circumstances is entitled to the property are not
correct according to principle. His rights are based solely on his pos-
session, and start from the absence of any de facto control at the
moment of finding.23 Possession or de facto control in some one else
at the time of finding should, therefore, defeat the finder's right resulting
from his possession.
The question of a finder's right to possession as against the owner
of the premises on which a chattel is found does not seem to have
squarely arisen in Missouri. Hoagland v. Highland Park Amusement
Co.24 is frequently cited for the proposition that the finder is entitled
to possession against the owner of the premises; but the action was
for a personal injury inflicted on the finder by the owner of the park
and his servants, in arresting him and ejecting him from the park.
An erroneous instruction was given by the trial court, in reviewing
which the court intimated that the finder was entitled to possess the
chattel found on the ground. But the decision may be rested on the
ground that the treatment of the finder was not justified even tho he
was not entitled to the possession and the instruction was erroneous
apart from the statement as to the duty on the owner of the premises
to exercise reasonable care to protect the chattel for the owner.
As regards the finder's rights, the distinction between lost and
misplaced goods is wholly arbitrary. His right to possession depends
upon whether any person other than the owner can show a prior pos-
session. This was the real basis for the decision in South Staffordshire
Water Co. v. Sharman and the line of cases cited in accord with it.
Whether goods are lost or misplaced, the right to possession would
seem to depend on the absence of a prior possession in some one else
than the owner. And if this distinction were followed logically, there
would seem to be no reason for the distinction between lost and mis-
placed chattels.
In Missouri the rights of a finder of a chattel, the value of which
is ten dollars or more have been enlarged by statute. 25 In addition to
providing a statutory method by which notice of the finding must be
given and to fixing a penalty for failure to give such notice, the statute
also provides that if the owner does not appear within one year from
23. Pollock & Wright, Possession In the Conmmon Law. p. 40.
24. (1902) 170 Mo. 335.
25. Revised Statutes 1909, §§ 8268-8273.
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the date of publication in the newspaper and if the value of the found
chattel exceeds twenty dollars, "the same shall vest in the finder"
and the owner shall have no right to it thereafter. But no statutory
period is set for the acquisition of title as against the owner when
the value is between ten dollars and twenty dollars. The statute does
not in terms deal with the rights of finders against other persons
than the owner.
In Foster v. Fidelity Safe Deposit Co.,26 the plaintiff, a customer of
defendant, discovered an envelope of paper bills, on the corner of a
table in one of defendant's private rooms, the door to which was
always kept locked and to which only certain customers had access.
The court held that the envelope being found on the table was not lost
property, that it was in defendant's possession and under the protection
of its house and hence the defendant had a better right to its posses-
sion than did the plaintiff. In this holding the decision is in accord
with the cases above cited on this point. But the court further says
that "if the money was lost In a legal sense, the defendant has no
sort of possession of It" and admits in such a case the finder would
be entitled to it. It is difficult to understand why the defendant's
possession of the chattel should depend on whether it was involuntarily
or voluntarily placed on its premises. Altho the location of the envelope
was unknown to the bank, "the intent to exclude others from it may be
contained in the larger intent to exclude others from the place where
it is." 27
It is to be hoped that this dictum in Foster v. Fidelity Trust Co.,
in line with the court's clear intimation in Hoagland v. Forest Park
Amusement Co., will not be followed when a case arises in which it
is actually involved. It is submitted that the holding of the English
court in South Staffordshire Water Co. v. Sharman is better founded
in reason and in public policy. GARDNER SMITH.
PROCESS-EFFECT OF MISNOMER IN SERVICE RY PUBLICATION. Brown
v. Peak.-If a person has used an adopted or a fictitious name by
which he can be sufficiently identified as a consequence of his user, he
may be sued by that name. 2 An improper or insufficient naming of a
defendant in service of process presents little difficulty where the de-
fendant is served personally. He Is thereby informed that he is the
person intended to be sued and unless he takes advantage of the defect
26. (Mo., 1915) 174 S. W. 376.
27. Holmes, Common Law, p. 222.
1. (1915) 177 S. W. 645.
2. Sparks v. Dispatch Transfer Co. (1891) 104 Mo. 531, 15 S. W. 417;
Radley v. Meek (1914) 178 Mo. App. 238, 165 S. W. 1192; Tuggle v. Bank
of Cave Spring (1910) 8 Ga. App. 291, 68 S. E. 1070; Clark v. Clark (1878)
19 Kan. 522; Union Brewing Co. v. Intler8tate Bank Co. (1909) 240 Ill. 454,
88 N. E. 997: Gilligan v. Casey (1912) 205 Mass. 26, 91 N. E. 124; Robbins
v. Midkiff (1907) 46 Tex. Civ. App. 272, 102 S. W. 430; Gotthelf v. Shapiro
(1909) 136 App. Dlv. 1, 120 N. Y. Supp. 210.
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in the service by plea in abatement, a judgment rendered against him
will be valid.3 The jurisdiction in such a case depends upon the actual
service of the process and a slight inaccuracy in naming a party becomes
immaterial.
But where the only notice is by publication and the defendant does
not appear personally, the naming of the defendant is the life of the
notice and the jurisdiction of the court depends upon its sufficiency.
Unless the name Is fully and correctly set forth the published notice is
ineffectual,4 with certain exceptions to be hereafter noted. For this
purpose the full name consists of the first Christian or given name and
the surname or patronymic, both of which taken together constitute
the legal name of a person. The middle name or initial is no part of a
legal designation and may therefore be omitted. Even the insertion
of a wrong middle name or initial is harmless. Accordingly, in Beckner
v. McLinn 5 where a defendant named Mary Ann Byers had been de-
scribed in the order of publication as "Mary E. Byers", it was held that
she was properly notified. But in Steinmann v. Strimple a it was held
that an order of publication in an action to foreclose a mechanic's
lien was void because the defendant Joab Strimple was named as
"J. Strimple". So in Vincent v. MeansT it was held that a judgment
against "M. C. Vincent" was void as against Minos C. Vincent. Nor
will a nickname serve in the place of a Christian name, even tho it
is unmistakable, for in Ohlmann v. Clarkson Sawmill Company s it was
held that notice directed to "Mike Ohlmann" was insufficient to give
the court jurisdiction against Michael Ohlmann. Cruzer v. Stephens D
seems to be out of line with these cases. There in a suit for taxes,
notice by publication had been directed to "Etta R. Fisher and
Fisher, her husband," and the judgment against the husband was held
to be good against collateral attack. It would be difficult to justify such
a decision if direct attack had been made on the judgment and in view
of the cases above cited, Cruzer v. Stephens seems to stand by itself.
3. Parry v. Woodson (1836) 33 Mo. 347; Skelton v. Sackett (1886) 91Mo. 377, 5 S. WV. 874; Corrig.an v. Sclimidt (1895) 126 Mo. 304, 311, 28 S.W. 874; State ex rel. Ziegenhein v. Burr (1898) 143 Mo. 209, 44 8. W. 1045;
Roberts v. Stona (1903) 99 Mo. App. 425, 431, 73 S. W. 388; Pond v. Ennis(1873) 69 111. 341; Lyon v. Crew Levick Co. (1896) 63 Ii. App. 329; Lind-
sey v. Delano (1889) 78 Iowa 350, 43 N. W. 218; First National Batik v. Jag-
pers (1869) 31. Md. 38, 100 Am. Dec. 53; Alabama v. Vicksburg Ry. Go. (1891)
69 Miss. 262, 13 So. 844. Cf. Howard V. Brown (1906) 197 Mo. 36, 95 S.
W. 191.
4. Gillingham v. Brown (1905) 187 Mo. 181, 85 S. W. 1113; EBarts v.
Missouri Lumber Go. (1906) 193 Mo. 433, 92 S. W. 373; White v. Gramiley(1911) 236 Mo. 647, 139 S. W. 127. Cf. Proctor v. Smith (1909) 220 Mo. 104,
119 S. W. 409.5. (1891) 107 Mo. 277. 17 S. W. 819. See also Morrison v. Turnbaugh(1905) 192 Mo. 427, 91 S. IV. 152; Howard v. Brown (1906) 197 Mo. 36, 95S. W. 191.
6. (1888) 29 Mo. App. 478, 484.
7. (1904) 184 Mo. 327, 82 S. W. 96.
8. (1909) 222 Mo. 62, 120 S. W. 1155.9. (1894) 123 Mo. 337, 27 S. W. 557. Cf. Root v. Fellowes (1850) 6
Cush. 29.
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On account of the arbitrary orthography and pronunciations given
to proper names and the variant spellings in common use the courts
have formulated the doctrine of idem sonans in dealing with this ques-
tion of misnomer. In Groton v. Holliday-Klotz Land Co.,10 the Supreme
Court stated the "accepted doctrine" to be "that names are idem sonans
if the attentive ear finds difficulty in distinguishing them when pro-
nounced, or common and long continued usage has by corruption or
abbreviation made them identical in pronunciation." Where there is a
doubt as to the applicability of the doctrine of idern sonans, the identity
of pronunciation becomes a question of fact to be determined by evi-
dence of the pronunciation."1 Since the method of attaining jurisdiction.
by substituted or constructive service is exceptional, a few jurisdictions
have taken the position that if service by publication is made under
the wrong name it will not be validated by resort to the doctrine of
idem sonans.12 Generally, no such exception prevails for the service
is upheld without any discussion as to the applicability of the doctrine
in such cases.13
. It is well settled that the use of the initials of the Christian name
is not sufficient for the purpose of notice by publication. But in
McDermott v. Gray 14 the court admitted the possibility of exceptions to
this general rule based on what may be termed a loose estoppel, and
it was held that where a man had secured a marriage license which
described him as "A. H. Gray" and had been married by the same
initials and had cashed checks and transacted other business as "A. H.
Gray," such designation in a suit for divorce was sufficient. And so In
Elting v. Gould 15 a judgment in a tax suit was held valid tho based
upon service by publication which designated the owner by the initials
of his given name, where his name was so written in the recorded
deeds to the land. The statute 16 which provides that suits for de-
linquent taxes "shall be prosecuted against the owner of the property,
if known, and if not known, then against the last owner of record",
was not referred to in this early case; but in later cases 17 it seems
to have influenced the court in sustaining the theory of estoppel there
advanced.
10. (1905) 189 Mo. 322, 87 S. W. 37. Cf. Williams v. Grudier (1915)
264 Mo. 216, 174 S. W. 213.
11. Gorman v. Dierkes (1834) 3 Mo. 576; Oeer v. Mis8ouri Lumber Go.(1896) 134 Mo. 85, 34 S. W. 1099; Hunkers v. Statc (1899) 87 Ala. 94, 6 So.
357: Galveston 11. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Sanchez (1901) 26 Tex. Civ. App. 536,
65 S. W. 893.
12. Ifubner v. Reickhoff (1897) 103 Iowa 368, 72 N. W. 540; Schoenfeld'
Y. Bourke (1909) 159 Mich. 139, 123 N. W. 537.
13. Graton V. Holliday Land Co. (1905) 189 Mo. 322, 87 S. W. 37;
Davison v. Banker's Life Assn. (1912) 166 Mo. App. 625, 150 S. W. 713;
Grober v. Clccts (1903) 71 Ark. 568, 75 S. W. 555.
14. (1906) 198 Mo. 266, 95 S. W. 431.
15. (1888) 96 Mo. 535, 9 S. W. 922. Cited with approval in Turner v.
Gregory (1899) 151 Mo. 100, 52 S. W. 234; Ohlmon v. Clarkson Sawmill Co.
(1909) 222 Mo. 52, 120 S. W. 1155: White v. Himnmelberger-Harrison Lumber
Go. (1912) 240 Mo. 13, 139 S. W. 535; Brown v. Peak (1915) 177 S. W. 645.
16. Revised Statutes 1909, § 11498.
17. Stevenson v. Brown (1915) 264 Mo. 182, 188, 174 S. W. 414.
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In Turner v. Gregory 1s the leading case on this question, it Is
laid down that in constructive service the real record name of the
land owner in which he took title, as distinguished from the colloquial
name he was known by in the neighborhood of the land and to which
he answered among those who knew him, must be used in designating
him in an order of publication in a tax suit. Turner's record name was
"Singleton V. Turner"; the "V" in his name stood for "Vaughn".
Where he lived, he was usually called "Vaughn". He was sued for
taxes as "Vaughn Turner". It was held that "where resort is had
to this method, a substantial even rigid, observance of the law is re-
quired, otherwise the judgment is void." In White v. Himmelberger-
Harrison Lumber Co.,19 the grantee was designated as "0. H. P. Wil-
liams"; the recorder in copying the deed, by mistake wrote the initials
"0. N. P.", changing the middle initial from "H." to "N". Thereafter
in a suit for delinquent taxes upon notice by publication to "0. N. P.
Williams" it was held that as the owner "Williams" took the deed by
his initials, the rule that a mistake in the middle initial is immaterial
applied. In Stevenson v. Brown,20 where land recorded in the name
of "Martha E. Stevenson" was sold under judgment predicated upon
service by publication directed to "M. E. Stevenson", it was proved
that she had at other times taken land by her initials, but the court
unanimously held that while a person whose recorded deed designated
her by her initials only is estopped to deny the validity of a judgment
in a proceeding in which she is designated by such initials, no such
estoppel arises from the fact that she has taken title to other land by
deeds describing her by her initials only. It was held that the tax
judgment was void for want of jurisdiction and that "the tax deed
falls with the judgment." When, therefore, the question of the suf-
ficiency of an order of publication directed to "W. G. Easley" was
recently presented to the Supreme Court in Russ v. Hope,21 the latest
case on this subject, it looked to the record and found that the record
owner was "William G. Easley", and held that such publication did
not confer jurisdiction upon the court, and that the sheriff's deed based
upon a sale under judgment rendered would not convey the title of
"William G. Easley."
Mosely v. Reiley 22 stands alone and in striking contrast with the
decisions above noted. There notice by publication was directed to
"C. T. Clements" in a suit for taxes on land which was recorded in
the name of "Charles T. Clements," and a sheriff's deed given under
the judgment in the suit purported to convey the title of "C. T.
Clements". The plaintiff who claimed under a quit-claim deed signed
18. (1899) 151 Mo. 100, 103, 52 S. W. 234.
19. (1912) 240 Mo. 13, 139 S. W, 553.
20. (1915) 264 Mo. 182, 187, 174 S. W. 414.
21. (1915) 178 S. W. 447.
22. (1894) 126 Mo. 124, 28 S. W. 895.
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"C. T. Clements" brought ejectment against one who claimed under
the sheriff's deed and judgment was given for the defendant.23 In the
opinion of the court the judgment was, however, based upon the ground
that service by publication directed to "C. T. Clements" was a suf-
ficient notice, inasmuch as if he had appeared personally and defended
an action in which he was served by an improper Christian name judg-
ment would have bound him. The court failed to draw the distinction
between service by publication and personal service which is noted
above, and the argument of the court in Mosely v. Reiley would have
necessitated a different result in Elting v. Gould and in the numerous
cases which have followed It. In the subsequent references to Mosely
v. Reiley,24 the case has invariably been distinguished from cases of
the Elting v. Gould type on the ground that by executing a deed in the
same initials which were employed in the service by publication in
the tax suit, the defendant in the tax suit had estopped himself from
denying the validity of the judgment in the tax suit and the deed
executed in compliance with it and that this estoppel was effectual
against such defendant's grantees. This is the explanation of Mosely
v. Reiley which is given in the opinion of the court in Brown v. Peak,2 5
but it is manifestly unsound in view of the fact that in Mosely v. Reiley
the court had no jurisdiction at the time the judgment was rendered
and no later act of the defendant in the tax suit could validate the void
judgment and deed given in compliance with it.
In the recent case of Brown v. Peak,25 the question of the effect
of misnomer in service by publication was again before the Supreme
Court. Certain land was conveyed by a deed duly recorded, in which
the grantee was designated as "A. Willard Humphreys". Thereafter
suit for taxes was commenced against Humphreys, a non-resident, based
upon service by publication which, altho the fact does not clearly ap-
pear in the report of Brown v. Pealk, was probably directed to "A. W.
Humphreys" and under a judgment for taxes rendered in that suit, a
sheriff's deed was executed which purported to convey the title of
"A. W. Humphreys". The plaintiff in Brown v. Pealk claimed under
the grantee named in the sheriff's deed and sought to quiet title against
the defendant who claimed under a quit-claim deed executed by
"A. W. Humphreys" subsequently to the execution of the sheriff's deed.
Brown v. Peak, therefore, differs from Mosely v. Reiley in that the
record title was in the name of A. Willard Humphreys, whereas in
Alosely v. Reiley the record title was in the name of Charles T.
23. As precedent for Its holding the court cited Martin v. Barron (1866)
87 Mo. 300, in which it appears that the defendant was personally served,
which distinguishes it from the case the court was then considering.
24. Turner v. Gregory (1899) 151 Mo. 100, 106, 52 S. W. 234: Burkhiam v.
Manteall (1906) 195 Mo. 500, 507. 04 S. W. 520; OhlmoIu V. Clarkson Saw-
mill Co. (1909) 222 Mo. 62, 67, 120 S. W. 1155. But see Riffle v. Ozark Land
A Lumber Jo. (1!)02) 03 Mo. App. 41, 45, 46.
25. (1915) 177 S. W. 645.
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Clements. In the opinion by BOND, J., which was adopted as the opinion
of the court, Mosely v. Reiley was said to be "directly in point" and
was made the chief basis for holding that the sheriff's deed conveyed
a good title against one claiming under the quit-claim deed. But a
majority of the court stated very clearly that Mosely v. Reiley is wrong
and ought to be overruled. It would seem, therefore, that Brown v.
Peak offers no strength to the doctrine of Mosely v. Reiley and the
actual judgment in Brown v. Peak may be justified wholly independ-
ently of Mosely v. Reiley on the ground that since the middle name
and initial can be entirely neglected, following the principle behind
the decisions of Elting v. Gould,26 Turner v. Gregory,27 Morrison v.
Turnbaugh,28 and White v. Himmelberger-Harrison Lumber Co.,29 the
initial A. was a sufficient designation in the sheriff's deed since that
initial appears in the recorded deed to Humphreys in place of the
first Christian name. It is surprising that this point was not noticed
in the opinion adopted by the court for it seems to have been the
basis of the concurring opinion by BROWN, J. The majority of the court
seems to have endeavored to bolster up the result with the suggestion
that the letter A may have been the full first Christian name of
Humphreys either because no evidence of any other full Christian
name was offered or because Humphreys had substituted it for some
other full Christian name by reason of his user. This suggestion is
entitled to less weight because it is not shown that Humphreys had
used the letter A instead of his first name in any other instance than
in taking the title to the land in question and in executing the quit-
claim deed under which the defendant claims. It should also be
noted that a period was used after the letter A, which clearly indicates
that it was used by Humphreys as an initial, tho of course it would
be possible for one to adopt both a letter and a period as his name.
It is to be regretted that Mosely v. Reiley was not overruled In Brown
v. Peak in view of the fact that the latter case may be rested on an
independent ground; but since four of the seven judges have indicated
their disapproval of Mosely v. Reiley and their willingness to over-
rule it, the way should now be clear to a complete repudiation of
the doctrine that the execution of a quit-claim deed subsequently to
the execution of a sheriff's deed based on a judgment which is void
because of a defect in the service of publication which renders the
court without any jurisdiction, estops the defendant in a tax suit from
setting up what would otherwise be a good title.
J. C. SHAPIRO.
26. (1888) 96 Mo. 535, 9 S. W. 922.
27. (1899) 151 Mo. 100, 52 S. MI. 234.
28. (1905) 192 Mo. 427, 91 S. W. 152.
29. (1912) 240 Mo. 13, 139 S. W. 553.
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SEALS-EFFECT OF STATUTE ABOLISHING USE OF PRIVATE SEALS. State
ex rel Spellman v. Parke-Davis & 0o.l-By the early common law, a
seal was an impression upon wax or some other tenacious substance.
2
But the tendency has long been toward a relaxation in the requirements
for a seal. An impression of a seal made on the paper of an instru-
ment which purports to be under seal makes the instrument a specialty.."
If a piece of paper is cut out and affixed to a wafer or mucilage on the
-deed, that is by common law a sufficient sealing of the instrument.
The impression is not required to be apparent.4 When a commissioner
empowered to execute a deed to county land under his hand and seal
is authorized by the county court to execute such a deed, the instru-
ment is sealed if he affixes the seal of the county court and acknowl-
edges it as his seal.5
By statute, a scroll may be a seal under certain circumstances.
The statute provides that "every instrument in writing expressed on
the face thereof to be sealed and to which the person executing the
same shall affix a scroll by way of a seal shall be declared and adjudged
to be sealed." 6 If a writing purports on its face to be under seal but
there is no scroll or common law seal affixed, it is not a sealed instru-
ment.7 On the other hand, if a statutory scroll is affixed but there
is no expression in the body of the instrument that the writing is
under seal, it is not a sealed instrument.8 The scroll must be identified
as a seal in the body of the instrument. A mere writing of the word
seaZ within the scroll is not of itself sufficient.9 Even where the instru-
ment is in the body thereof described as an indenture, that is not a
sufficient identification of the scroll affixed below.1o When in a sher-
iff's deed the word seal is enclosed in a scroll or brackets and is re-
ferred to or adopted, that is a sufficient sealing.'" The statutory scroll,
however, does not operate as a seal on public records. Altho a public
official is authorized to use his private seal in executing any public
document or record in case no seal is provided, yet he cannot use a
scroll as his private seal. He must use a common law seal which
is an impression on wax or other tenacious substance.12
As to corporations, the early common law doctrine was that they
could express their assent only by their common seal and that they
1. (1915) 177 S. 1W. 1070.
2. 4 Kent, Commentaries (11th ed.) p. 523.
3. Allen v. Sullivan R. R. Co. (1855) 32 N. H. 446.
4. Pease v. Lawson (1862) 33 Mo. 35; Turner v. Field (1869) 44 Mo.382.
5. Alt v. Stoker (1894) 127 Mo. 466, 30 S. W. 132.
6. Revised Statutes 1835, p. 118, § 3.
7. Grimsley v. Riley (1837) 5 Mo. 280; State ex rel. West V. ThotnVson(1872) 49 Mo. 188.
8. Boynton v. Reynolds (1831) 3 Mo. 47.
9. Glassoock v. GlassOck (1844) 8 Mo. 577.
10. Walker v. Keile (1843) 8 Mo. 218.
11. Samuels v. Shelton (1871) 48 Mo. 444; Groner v. Smith (1872) 49
Mo. 318.
12. Gates v. State (1850) 13 Mo. 11.
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could only bind themselves by deed or special contract. 3 The idea
was that a corporation being an invisible body could manifest ita
intentions only by its common seal.14 Such a doctrine however is
unworkable in modern life, so it has been greatly relaxed in Missouri
both by statute and decisions. The Missouri statute provides that
"parol contracts may be binding upon corporations if made by an
agent duly authorized by a corporate vote or under the general regu-
lations of the corporation."!, As to conveyances of land, it is pro-
vided that "it shall be lawful for any corporation to convey lands by
deed sealed with the common seal of said corporation and signed
by the president, vice-president or presiding member or trustee of
said corporation." 16 A corporation is also authorized to make and
use a common seal and to alter the same at pleasure.17 This power,
however, Is permissive, not mandatory. So a corporation can make a
binding parol contract. Even where the contract recites that it is
sealed, the absence of the corporate seal will not be fatal to it.18 The
assignment of notes to which the corporate seal is not attached is
also valid.19 If a deed of conveyance is not signed in the name of the
corporation but is signed by the president in his name as president
of the corporation and if the corporate seal is affixed, it is the deed,
not of the president, but of the corporation.2o The corporate seal
evidences that the deed is a corporate deed. The seal of the corporation
Is taken as the only proper evidence of its act in all cases where a
seal would be required if the Instrument were executed by an tndi-
vidual.21 But in most states and also in England, the common law
doctrine that corporations can do no act or execute no writing unless
the corporate seal is affixed is almost wholly repudiated.22 The ten-
dency is to require the corporate act or writing to be sealed only when
sealing would be essential to its validity if executed by an individual.23
Another question in this connection is as to the appointment of an
agent to execute a sealed instrument. The Common law doctrine
is that authority to execute an instrument necessarily under seal could
only be conferred by a sealed instrument.24 If the agent, however,
unnecessarily attaches a seal to a sealed contract, parol authority of
the agent will be sufficient as the contract will be allowed to operate
13. Angell and Ames, Corporations (9th ed.) § 228.
14. 1 Blackstone, Commentaries (Lewis's ed.) § 475.
15. Revised Statutes 1845, p. 232, Revised Statutes 1909. § 2993.
16. Revised Statutes 1845, p. 236, Revised Statutes 19)09, § 3001.17. Revised Statutes 1845, p. 231, Revised Statutes 1909, § 2990.
18. Stevens v. Modern Maccabees (1910) 153 Mo. 196, 132 S. W. 757.
19. Buckley v. Brikgs (1860) 30 Mo. 452.
20. Sheiealter v. Pirner (1874) 55 Mo. 218.
21. See Sandford v. ''reinlett (1868) 42 Mo. 384.
22. Taylor, Landlord and Tenant (5th ed.) § 127.
23. See Sandford v. Trenett (1868) 42 Mo. 384- Sears, Corporations in
Missouri, § 212: Morawetz, Private Corporations (2d ed.) § 338.
24. 1 Mechem, Agency, § 212; St. Louis Dairy Co. v. Saucr (1894) 16 Mo.
App. 1.
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as a simple contract.2 5 But when a corporation is a principal, a
somewhat different doctrine prevails. The early common law doctrine
that the appointment of a corporate agent must be under the corporate
seal has been greatly relaxed. When the authorization of a corporate
agent is not under seal and when the instrument by law is not required
to be sealed, the agent can execute an instrument binding on the
corporation,26 even -if the corporate seal is affixed.27 His authority
may be shown in other ways. The court, in absence of proof to the
contrary, will presume from the fact that the corporate seal is affixed;
that the agent did not exceed his authority in executing the instru-
ment.2 ' The presence of the corporate seal will raise the same pre-
sumption when the instrument is by law required to be sealed.29
There is no Missouri case, however, deciding whether an agent can
be authorized to execute a corporate sealed instrument by an Instru-
ment not under seal when his lack of authority is shown by the other
parties to the suit. The chief purpose of the corporate seal is to
manifest the corporate intent.3o But a vote or resolution by the board
of directors of a corporation as clearly manifests the corporate intent
as does a corporate seal; so an agent authorized by such a vote or
resolution should on principle be able to execute a deed or bond as
binding as if his appointment were evidenced by a corporate seal.31
The law of sealed instruments has been greatly changed by stat-
ute. The statute provides that "the use of private seals in written
contracts, conveyances of real estate and all other instruments of
writing heretofore required by law to be sealed (except the seals
of corporations) is hereby abolished, but the addition of a private
seal to any such instrument shall not in any manner affect its force,
validity, or character or in any way change the construction thereof." 82
This section makes unnecessary the use of a private seal on a private
instrument. In State v. TobIe33 where the defendant was indicted
for forging a deed, it was held that deed no longer imports a sealed
instrument. In a covenant to release one of the joint tortfeasors, a
seal no longer imports a satisfaction of the claim. 34 Furthermore,
25. Schuetze v. Bailey (1867) 40 Mo. 69.
26. Southgate v. Atlantic . P. R. Co. (1875) 61 Mo. 89; Emmans v. Be-
celsior Distilling CO. (1881) 9 Mo. App. 578 memorandum.
27. Sandford v. Tremleit (1868) 42 Mo. 384.
28. Musser v. Johnson (1867) 42 Mo. 74; Eppwright v. Nickerson (1883)
78 Mo. 482; Browvnell & Wight Car Co. v. Barnhard (1893) 116 Mo. 667, 22 S.
W. 503.
29. Foster v. Pacific Railroad Co. (1877) 3 Mo. App. 566, memorandum;
Missouri Fire Clay Works v. Ellison (1888) 30 Mo. App. 67.
390. 1 Blackstone, Commentaries (Lewis's ed.) § 475.
31. 1 Morawetz, Private Corporations (2d ed.) § 318; See Bank of Colum-
bia V. Patterson (1813) 7 Cranch (U. S.) 299; Mechanics Bank of Alexandria
v. Bank of Columbia (1827) 5 Wheaton (U. S.) 326; Fleckner v. Bank of the
United States (1823) 8 Wheaton (U. S.) 338.
32. Revised Statutes 1909, § 2773. This section was first enacted Feb.
21, 1893.
33. (1897) 141 Mo. 547. 42 S. W. 1076.
34. Judd v. Walker (1911) 158 Mo. App. 156, 138 S. W. 655.
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courts of equity will look behind the seal to see if there is any con-
sideration, and will not enforce a sealed contract 35 or sealed release
of judgment 36 unless there is an actual consideration. There appears
to be no Missouri case deciding whether a court of law will also look
behind the seal to see if there is any consideration.
The effect of the -statute abolishing seals on gifts of chattels pre-
sents a question of some nicety. It is generally recognized that the
gift of chattels may be effective when evidenced by a deed tho there
is no delivery of the chattel.37 This is sometimes said to rest on
estoppel,8S but in truth it is nothing more than the statement of the
formality of the transfer of title. The seal does not in any sense
take the place of consideration for consideration Is not required. The
seal is merely a formal substitute for delivery of the chattel itself.
It would seem that the effect of the statute abolishing seals has been
to abolish the strict requirement of the seal In an Instrument which
evidences a gift of the chattel. It can hardly be contended that it
has been the effect of the statute to make gifts of chattels without
delivery impossible. Just as land can be conveyed by an instrument
which need no longer be sealed it would seem a gift of a chattel may
now be evidenced by an instrument which is not under seal.
As the use of private seals (except the seals of corporations)
in all instruments of writing heretofore required by law to be under
seal has been abolished, it would seem that an agent can execute an
instrument to which private seals are affixed, altho he has no authority
under seal to do so. Even when a corporation having a seal conveys
land, it seems that the officer or agent executing the sealed writing
may be authorized other than by a sealed instrument. In Donham v.
Hahn,39 the director and secretary of a corporation executed a'deed of
trust on certain land held by the corporation. The secretary had no
direct authority either by deed or by vote of the directors, but from the
fact that he had on several other occasions executed the Instruments
without protest the court assumed that this was the approved custom
of the corporation. When the acknowledgment of the deed of con-
veyance states that the corporate seal is attached and that the deed
was signed by the proper officers, the acknowledgment does not have
to state that the officers were authorized to execute the deed by the
35. Bosley v. Bosley (1900) 85 Mo. App. 424.
36. Winter v. K. C. Cable Ry. Co. (1900) 160 Mo. 159, 61 S. W. 606.
37. McCutcheon's Admrs. V. McCutcheon (1839) 9 Porter (Ala.) 650;
Horn v. Gartman (1.846) 1 Fla. 63; Newuan v. James (1847) 12 Ala. 29;
Gordon v. Wilson (1856) 49 N. C. 64; Green v. Goodal (1860) 41 Tenn. 404;
Hogue v. Bierne (1871) 4 W. Va. 658; Walker v. Crews (1882) 73 Ala. 412 :
Tarbow v. Grant (1898) 56 N. J. Eq. 199, 39 Atl. 378; Ruiz v. Dow (1896)
113 Cal. 490, 45 Pac. 867.
38. McWillie v. Van Vacter (1858) 35 Miss. 428; McCutheon's Admrs.
V. McCutcheon (1839) 9 Porter (Ala.) 650; Tarboo v. Grsant (1898) 56 N. J.
Eq. 199; 2 Schouler, Personal Property (3d ed.) § 88; Thornton, Gifts and
Advancements, § 190.
39. (1894) 127 Mo. 439, 30 S. W. 134.
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board of directors. The deed is prima facie sufficient.40 The general
doctrine seems to be that an agent of a corporation may be appointed
without the use of a seal, whatever may be the purpose of the agency. 41
If a corporate seal is affixed to an instrument not required by law
to be sealed, as for example an assignment of a claim by a corporation,
the seal is prima facie evidence that the instrument was the act of
the corporation.42 But if the corporate seal is not affixed to the assign-
ment, the presumption carried with the seal that the officer had
authority to execute the instrument does not arise and his authority
must be gathered from other sources.4 3 Hence this section in no way
affects the construction of an instrument bearing a corporate seal.
It remains to be pointed out what corporate instruments must
bear the corporate seal. If the instrument is required by law to bear
the corporate seal, as in the conveyance of real estate 44 or if a statutory
bond Is required, such an instrument must still be sealed. But if
the corporation has no corporate seal, its deed conveying real estate is
binding notwithstanding that no corporate seal is affixed.45 Further,
if a corporation does have a corporate seal and if it gives an appeal
bond, such a bond on the ratification of its imperfect execution be-
comes binding even tho the corporate seal is not attached.46
In State ex rel. Spellman v. Parke-Davis & Co.47 a question arose
as to the validity of an attachment bond executed by an agent of de-
fendant corporation. The corporation had a common seal but it was
not affixed to the instrument. No attachment bond was required by
statute, since the person against whom the attachment was levied was
a non-resident.48 Altho the corporate seal was not affixed, the bond
was held to be binding. This decision is In accord with the principles
above set forth with regard to corporate instruments and corporate
agents. It illustrates how far the law has departed from the old com-
mon law requirement that all corporate instruments be sealed.
GARDNER SMITH.
40. Strother v. Barrow (1912) 246 Mo. 241, 151 S. W. 960.
41. 1 Morawetz, Private Corporations (2d ed.) § 338.
42. Roth v. Continental Wire Co. (1902) 94 Mo. App. 236, 68 S. W. 594.
43. Degnan v. Thoroughmnan (1901) 88 Mo. App. 62.
44. Revised Statutes 1909, § 3001.
45. PulliB v. PuI14i Bros. Iron Co. (1900) 157 Mo. 565, 57 S. W. 1095.
46. Canpbell v. Pope (1888) 96 Mo. 468, 10 S. W. 187.
47. (Mo., 1915) 177 S. W. 1070.
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